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Summary: The authors of this argumentative article emphasize that the range
of the current crisis cannot be depleted in the diagnosis which is based on
cyclic consideration. It is both systematic and structural, which is derived from 
the genesis and the modus of neoliberalism, which has become dominant
during the previous decades. Other than that, it is emphasized that the current
crisis is “great”, because it forces relevant actors to face the structural charac-
teristics of contemporary shareholder-capitalism. The crisis also puts to a test 
the self-reflection of the economic science which faces certain deficits. The
authors believe that, given the tendencies in today’s economy, there can be
different scenarios for exiting the crisis and projecting a new modus of capital-
ism in the following period. Having in mind the openness of the present and the
uncertainty of the future, the authors describe those scenarios without project-
ing which one of them will be dominant.
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The current century left an inglorious mark. Truth be told, the beginning of the cen-
tury, from the economic point of view, implied optimism in view of the continuity of 
the dominant matrix of life manufacturing. Moreover, in the last quarter of the XX 
century, developed capitalist economies practiced the rehabilitation of liberal econo-
my in the form of a neoliberal mechanism with the results which, especially in the 
tenth decade of the twentieth century, were impressive. Namely, for nearly 120 
months the world’s largest economy, the American economy, thanks to the IT revo-
lution, and accordingly the boom in technology, recorded economical prosperity in 
expression of high growth rates, low unemployment rates, budget surplus. Under 
conditions of continuing supply-side economics in the late seventies and the early 
eighties of the XX century, forgoing state intervention policy, low tax rates, the 
American consumer, during the nineties, becomes (although, historically viewed, not 
for the first time) the holder of the surplus money (Kosta Josifidis 2009). 
In the given circumstances, it was normal for a part of that money, outside the 
proverbial consumerism (excluding classical types of savings), to be converted to 
quick fortune making by means of stock market gambling. The stock market indica-
tors also spread inordinate positive expectations, the bubble being pumped up until 
March 2001, when the stock markets (both NYSE and NASDAQ) were seriously 
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under Greenspan’s leadership faced a risk of an abrupt decrease in interest rates, 
leading to the decrease of the short-term interest rate of the Central bank towards 1% 
in 2003, which was not the case since 1958 (Evan F. Koenig and Jim Dolmas 2003), 
which was actually intended to sustain the level of aggregate demand, especially in 
the domain of permanent consumer goods, at long last, housing. (The same happened 
in August 2007, when FED began lowering interest rates, in order to reach the level 
of 0-0,25%, while the Central Bank of Europe began lowering interest rates no soon-
er than October 2008, and lowered them to the level of 1% - Ansgar Belke and Jens 
Close 2010). 
Thereby, the position that American economy, as the main architect of world 
economy, is stable, its stock markets prosperous, was further fuelled. However, there 
began a period of inadequate financial market regulation, excessive granting of cheap 
credit to all possible users (i.e. NINJA syndrome – non income, non job, non asset, as 
a form of disputable crediting), further “securitarization” of such securities, which in 
turn actually prolonged the agony and procrastinated the cognition that the emperor 
is naked, and that this practice cannot be continued forever.  
Come autumn 2007. The actors on all levels face the consequences of the high 
risk Friedman/Greenspan policy of implicit encouragement of stock market specula-
tion. However, this time, the collapse of the stock market indicators, in reference to 
the financial region of economy, with an unbelievably fast spill over (animal spirit 
mechanism, George A. Akerlof and Robert J. Shiller 2009; Richard A. Posner 2009) 
also dragged the real region of American economy to the bottom, with just as effi-
cient, speaking negatively, recession spill over, and sometime later the crisis, to all 
other leading capitalist economies in the world, not to mention the emerging and 
transition economies.  
The culmination of cynicism, manifested in the extravagance of the official 
government, demonstrated in the panic search for salvation in the form of state inter-
vention, forsaking decades of swearing on market fundamentalism, the omnipotence 
of auto regulation. Therefore, tax payers, who had observed the rapid enrichment of 
financial gurus silently, for decades, quietly aching from the incertitude of marketiza-
tion and flexibilization of economy, become over night, the shelter for the saviour of 
those stock market bonvivans. And to make matters absurd throughout, by saving the 
richness of speculators and leading managers, again silently, they watch as their work 
places are abolished, the pensions and health insurance vanish. 
Crises are processes when the old frameworks are perceived as limited, in 
other words, old formats can not be practiced any more, and new formats have not 
yet been created, or have not gained solid frames. They open a process of different, 
confronting interpretations, and an undecided area of resolvement. The world today 
is experiencing an economic crisis which many authoritative economists, in the 
context of analytical contemplation, and rightly so, relate to the memorable crisis in 
the thirties of the last century (Paul Krugman 2009). If we observe the course in the 
economy in the last decades, we can record outbrakes of various crisis procceses. 
Truth be told, the neoliberal classification created several phases of expansion: 
between 1982-1990, 1991-2002, 2001-2007. We can refer to econometric research 
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during the period between 1947-98 there had been no downturn trend of the return of 
capital (net rate of return on capital, Stacey Tevlin and Karl Whelan 2000). 
However, a global recesion endured in the early nineties of the XX century, by the 
end of 1978 half of the countries faced a growth crisis, which could also be recorded 
between 2000 and 2002. And if we move further in time and with a big leap, we 
record cycles of crisis undulations in previous decades (the crisis in Mexico in 1995, 
in East Asia in 1997, then in 2002 in Argentina, the dither of stock markets 1998-
2000, spectacular burst of the technology boom in relation to internet investments 
which led to 7 trillion of losses, and to the recession of 2001, and so on, not to men-
tion the recent crisis in food supply when the prices of certain food products began to 
soar) one must conclude that this crisis has a long prequel, and that it is an integral 
part, in other words, just a moment in the subsequent dynamics of mediate capital-
ism. Precisely, crisis shocks had been recorded earlier (stagnation in storing of dura-
ble consumer goods after 2005, the decline of consumption in the same year, the in-
crease of unemployment immediately after 2006 and so on), but the recognition of a 
crisis as a different one in relation to previous turbulences comes no sooner than Sep-
tember of last year (2008), after two weeks of severe losses. Moreover, ardent statis-
ticians can, in no time, calculate that during the time of financialized capitalism cris-
es multiply and outbreak at a quicker pace then before and such history of financial 
crisis can be retraced to the beginning of the XX century (Michael Bordo et al. 2001, 
pp. 51-82; Jan Toporowski 2005; Ozgur Orhangazi 2008). That means that, in spite 
of the continued trend of the rate of profit, the era from the beginning of the affirma-
tion of neoliberalism produced unsustainable cycles. The deregulation of financiali-
zation, the intensification of inequalities, and the submission of the financial sphere 
to speculative and rentier activities have produced negative circumstantial (by prod-
uct) aspects. The meaning of this is that, although this crisis broke out in the XXI 
century, we must trace her roots in the “long“ XX century. In other words: crises to-
day are much less dramatic than in the previous periods of capitalism, in the same 
way as in the thirties of the XX century, the expansion phases of neoliberal epochs 
had just been delaying, prolonging the problem. Accordingly, we consider speaking 
about a crawling crisis. 
Neoliberal hegemony, promoted by market fundamentalists (Paul Samuelson 
2009) and the practical philosophies of Thatcherism and Reaganomics, was in effect 
established due to the multidimensional crisis situations produced by the government 
policies at the time as well as the way in which certain international institutions func-
tioned. Now, it too came into crisis. Here, it is also of particular importance that the 
neoliberal hegemony has been, amongst other places, situated in the reform of na-
tional finances. Numerous researches indicate the domination of the financial capital, 
the diffusion of financial norms, the importance of financial deregulation in the allo-
cation of income and property. Price stability is no longer the leading idea, giving 
way to the stability of financial markets.                                                                                      
 This does not imply that “it all happened before”, that the existing crisis is 
deprived of any idiosyncrasy, but rather something else: initially, the current crisis 
has been anticipated as a routine turbulence which can be resolved using the instru-
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collapses and devalorization actions were stripped of regressive developments in real 
economy, for example, at the beginning of the current millennium there was a fall in 
the New York stock market (25%) during the period in which the American economy 
was already in an uplift. Confidence due to economic élan, the reduction of interest 
rates and generation of liquidity enabled the overcoming of the crisis eruption.  
Thereby, it should be clearly stated that the crisis has sources in the most de-
veloped economies of the world, in the modality of the market management and in 
the ideological self-understanding. In other words, this paper concerns the structural 
crisis of the way of functioning of global capitalism which originated after the neoli-
beralization (Josifidis and Alpar Lošonc 2007) starting from the seventies of the pre-
vious century, the crisis of its core moments. 
And here we are now, with an uncertain prognosis of the physiognomy, tem-
porality, depth, and consequences of the downturn, on every level, starting from the 
geopolitical and geo-economic, over trans- and national, all the way to the level of 
the un-conscience of a mere mortal, who volens-nolens, inevitably faces the destined 
oscillations of his own production, without being able to affect them, or accordingly, 
we are witnessing the superposition of oscillations which, by merging into one point 
in space, destructively and with interference produce a zero and offset existence.  
Indeed, recent indicators, as well as prognoses, in other words indicators for 
the end of 2009 truly indicate that the American economy shall be the first to come 
out of the crisis, provided that it is not all about encouraging market actors, an at-
tempt to restore confidence into confidence. Just so, the rising pessimistic expecta-
tions, the analogy with the events and flows from the thirties, the period of the Great 
Depression, tend towards caution in regard to the dynamics and aspects of coming 
out from the current phase of immense mistrust in the system. 
Why have we lengthened the framework? It seemed prudent to us to begin ex-
actly with the beginning of the century. And if we are at least partially right from the 
point of identifying global movements during the previous two centuries, relevant in 
the context of genealogy of capitalism, which can be seen from the fact that social 
projects, in terms of (in)voluntary associating of individuals into what is called socie-
ty, last for approximately two generations, then it is utterly logical that we are cur-
rently in the phase of the reviewing, maturing and/or saturation of the present capita-
listic organizing. Does this mean that after the post depression period, which was 
ruled over by interventionism, welfare state, Keynesian state, and which lasted for 
about two generations, until the mid and late seventies, a social overturn had been 
made? (Josifidis, Lošonc, and Novica Supić 2009) All right, we can call it an evolu-
tional overturn also, no matter how paradoxical/oxymoronic that sounds, in the form 
of Thatcherism and Reaganomics. The answer is affirmative, yes. There began a pe-
riod of reaffirmation and historical rehabilitation of the social pattern that caused the 
Great Depression (implicitly the Second World War, which indeed pulled capitalism 
out of the instability of the depression). Just before the outbreak of the Great crisis, 
there was also a reign of greed, spoil, intemperance as symptoms (not as causes), and 
when it all ended, again with the same – immense distrust in trust, which in turn had 
to end with World War. Solely a larger social disaster can repress the previous one, 105  Neoliberalism: Befall or Respite? 
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bearing in mind that man/population is principally of short memory and euphoric 
historical recollection.  
Let us go back to the eighties and the end of the previous century in general. 
The extra time followed, leaning obediently and robustly on market fundamentalism, 
overlaid by the pillars of globalization (IMF, WB, WTO), as alibis for the domina-
tion of the Anglo-Saxon form of capitalism, where nothing is certain except uncer-
tainty. The endangered welfare state, European continental forms of capitalism, each 
with its uniqueness, but also uniformity in regards to fiscal load, exerted substantial 
material fatigue. It is difficult to withstand international competition of commodities 
in the ambience of unequal inadequate competitive configuration of government rev-
enue (similar to a competition of two horses, with same physical predisposition, just 
that one is bearing a 30 kg rider and the other one a rider who has over 50kg), the 
physiognomy of the labour market (fix vs. flex), with overdue structural changes and 
untimely post industrialization and adjustment, especially in the IT sector. 
 Therefore, the extra time lasted for one generation, and as soon as the next 
generation came, i.e. the beginning of this century, material fatigue, again, appeared. 
The peak was done, material differentiation, even within the American middle class 
society, has been performed, the ratio of salaries for wage workers to salaries of top 
rate manager, or vice-versa, has been unbelievably increased (even during the sixties 
the ratio was 1:33, and before the crisis 1:330, or vice-versa). Therefore, in the evolu-
tionary sense, we can presume that the agony of the neoliberal matrix shall be con-
tinued, with the recurrence of ups/downs, until its disappearance, and simultaneous, 
parallel presentation of one/several new matrices, which account for the introduction 
of these speculations. This, of course, does not exclude the possibility that we are 
wrong, that neoliberalism is far tougher, that in front of it still lies a period of justifi-
cation (postneoliberalism, therefore a higher phase, is also mentioned in literature) 
with somewhat compromising recoils, as is the current one, when the base idea of 
auto regulation has been arcanely dismissed and the best solution reached after, and 
that is the biggest capitalist of them all – the government. Moreover, an idea of sys-
tematic ambivalence will most likely be promoted, according to which the American 
capitalism is incredibly flexible in the events of a boom, and when it falls in-
to/produces a crisis; it is then rigid and relies on the government. In such circums-
tances, it is not difficult to recognize chronic losers vs. winners.  
However, in that case we can ask several questions/ have dilemmas. Firstly, 
does this imply that there are no more fundamental postulates, in the expression of 
the consequentialism of the performing of idealistic purism, but that it is all just im-
provisation, manipulation and empty ideologization with the function of protecting 
the interest of only one team, that being the one with fewest members, and that the 
other side of the polarity is moved into the infinity of masses, and periodically, mas-
sive collateralness of social animals, considering that conscious would instruct some-
thing else. 
Secondly, does that not exclude the claim that nothing lasts forever, that 
processes, curvy by nature, still flow parallel, pluralistically, states vs. embryos com-
pete, intersect, are conceived and aborted numerous times, until there is a birth of a 
new deceitful, promising form, unconscious of its temporal destination.  106  Kosta Josifidis, Alpar Lošonc and Novica Supić 
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Thirdly, in the panic search for salvation and an exit from the disruption, the 
crisis, it is possible that there will be a reach out for known, déja vu, scenarios, in the 
lack of ideas and courage, just for the sake of taking in some air, and then continuing 
unscrupulously with the exploitation of a fluent matrix until the following, next or 
final escalation of the chronic conflict between greed and possibilities, which will 
not endure the repetition of sameness any more, but express the need of architecting 
an art nouveau, new art, or Jugendstil, lifestyle, but a hundred years later, i.e. in cur-
rent future.  
Fourthly, even if we are wrong, in the context of the story of two generations, 
with the expired deadline for one of them, stems that the generation in turn has to 
live through the rotting of the mechanism, resistance, flounder, apocalyptic social 
concurrencies, artificial creation of cataclysm (Iraq, Afghanistan, NATO bombing of 
Yugoslavia, possibly Iran etc), which brings us back to the beginning.  
In previous meditations, as well as the attitudes towards dilemmas, an initial 
conditionality has been set (typical for transitions), as well as scenarios of possible 
closer or further events in time, have been announced. Whether it is a recession, an 
acute, transient and short term one, with bland consequences, or even bigger ones, 
but still a transitory, common phase of eternal capitalist self adjustment? Or, is it, in 
fact, a chronic, long term, consequential, procedurally and materially immense 
process, which will in time generate a need for serious changes in the functioning of 
capitalism?  
Firstly, we believe that current economic developments are not of mere reces-
sional nature, in other words that it is not a matter of cyclic crises of capitalism. In 
fact, we claim that modern capitalism is in a serious systematic-structural crisis, 
which implies conceptualization, in the long run, of a new social contract, or the re-
turn to the pattern which preceded the neoliberal era, or, the combination of new and 
old, but certainly does not imply the infinite prolonging of the neoliberal concept in 
the form in which it (re)produced the crisis. But, this is a great crisis, and not a small 
crisis which can always be resolved with adjustment, technological corrections in the 
existing frameworks. No, the current crisis demands exactly the change of frame-
works, restructuring. This means that the practice based upon fine-tuning is no longer 
sufficient. Accordingly, we believe that there are financial readings of the crisis, 
though financial aspects only represent the symptoms of a deeper tendency in the 
current regime of shareholder-capitalism. As it is known, an otherwise marginalized 
economist Human Minsky has gained importance. In numerous analyses of his pres-
entation of internal tendency of capitalism, namely, about “stabilization that destabi-
lises“, represent the base of argumentation, thus we speak about the “Minsky-crisis“. 
We do not contest that Minsky has seen structural tendencies of fragility of the finan-
cial system, therefore, we extremely appreciate Minsky’s contribution (Hyman P. 
Minsky 1992, 1993; Pierro Ferri and Hyman P. Minsky 1992; Thomas Palley 2008), 
but our claim is that the depth of the crisis cannot be exhausted even with his argu-
mentation: let us state once again, this is not just a Minsky-crisis, but a structural-
systematic crisis. And if we look at structural crises in the history of capitalism, it is 
seen that the changes made represented a surprise which no one before expected.  107  Neoliberalism: Befall or Respite? 
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We concede that we are not prophetical enough, and that there are two main 
and/or possible supporting scenarios: 
 
I.  Inertial, the most benign scenario – the recession is of cyclic character; 
II.  Pessimistic/realistic scenario – the crisis is of systematic-structural charac-
ter; 
i.  Promiscuous scenario – two-way systematic alternation; 
ii.  Unconscious/confusing, wondering scenario – it is unknown what is 
going on, wondering in the dark and expecting a miracle; 
iii.  Conscious, uncertain scenario – the nature of the crisis is being manipu-
lated and concealed; 
iv.  Military, (un)certain scenario – it is clear what it is about, and with 
what means. 
 
Second framework – only frame(s)/scenarios 
 
Listed scenarios of possible recognizable forms of resolving the exit of the contem-
porary capitalism from the current phase and providing a historical determinant for 
future processes, presume broader or narrower elaborations, so in the following we 
shall, in the given imperative plane, follow an exposed multi-scenario approach, with 
an acceptable dose of caution, towards the naming, the character and suggested out-
come, as well as towards the nomenclature schedule itself, for the purpose of avoid-
ing vulgarizing and banalizing this attempt. 
 
(I) Inertial scenario, as suggested, or presumed, is the most benign scenario, 
but only if observed through the temporal prism of economic fluctuation. It is impli-
cit that it is a cyclic, transient phase of oscillation, almost a natural motion of capital-
ism. Dissociating from the fact that it is merely a temporally benign/transient reces-
sion is necessary, bearing that records in the financial and economic sphere  persis-
tently prove that the recession is deep (latest data mitigate the severity of the decline, 
keeping in mind that less negative or even positive growth rates of GDP and the rise 
of stock market indexes).  
However, high unemployment rates, and especially one of the pillars of neoli-
beral economy, a balanced budget, in all developed economies, exceed every usual 
and prescribed measure (in American economy it is over 10%, and the upper limits 
of deficit growth are still unknown, while European economies have completely for-
gotten the Maastricht criteria and are salvaging what must be salvaged – double stan-
dards are on stage). Losses of the banking sector are still unknown, or being hidden. 
The cessation of pumping, is followed by the facing with the depiction of the true 
state of matters, where unpleasant surprises are expected – this is particularly valid 
for European banks (moreover, with cessation of the effect of pump priming, a new, 
even harsher depression is also possible, with uncertainties in regard to the duration, 
losses, taking antirecession measures). 
The reaction was relatively swift, at least from the viewpoint of the Obama 
administration, seeing that the Bush administration attempted improvisations which 
had no effect (a big mistake was that it allowed the bankruptcy of the Lehman broth-108  Kosta Josifidis, Alpar Lošonc and Novica Supić 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2010, 1, pp. 101-117 
ers, considering that it generated an avalanche reaction, the further chain reaction 
collapsing). But, the pump priming mechanism, which did prevent a catastrophic out-
come, has not, at least from our point of view, been aggressive enough, in regard to 
the sum that had been pumped in, although there are opinions that the pumped sum 
of money is nevertheless enough for the lack of confidence in the financial system to 
slowly decrease. This way, socialization of losses, governmentalization, nationaliza-
tion, call it what you like, social-democratization of the American economy, or its 
Europeanization, as the loudest critics state, which goes back even to the absurd Re-
publican fear of the American socialism, is the only thing that could have been done. 
But, not taking into account that the intervention has been late and not strong enough, 
it is obvious that it was the only thing left to be done, and not repeat, in other words,  
to avoid a huge mistake from the thirties.  
The old lady, Europe, has not, nor jointly, nor by national economies separate-
ly, followed the aggressive American pump priming policy, although it is in a very 
sensitive phase of resolving huge budget deficits and further fate of the euro in the 
euro-zone. It is conceived that they made a mistake, and that the hesitation policy is 
going to return as a  boomerang, at least from the point of the crisis duration (al-
though the discourse is still open: the question is whether an adequate FED interven-
tion during the Great Depression, as the monetarist school has been complaining for 
decades, would have prevented the decade long apocalypse of capitalism, consider-
ing our standpoint that liberal capitalism of that era had been rotten enough and ready 
for the replacement of core principles of systematic-institutional nature). This time, 
the lender of  last resort played its role (although not the role of the employer of the 
last resort), justified the introduction of such an option, and prevented the further 
escalation of crisis, at least from the point of the initial scenario. What will follow 
then, if this scenario is a duly image of economic turbulences? In our opinion, it is a 
necessary temporal respite, capital is being rescued as it can and must be, it is being 
governmentalized, which is almost fiction like for the American economy and socie-
ty. Some people are being introduced as managers of leading companies who had 
been in the same position before the crisis, with the task of strengthening the compa-
nies and speeding up their exit from this phase, by reorganization and restructuring.  
It is uncertain how long this will take, but our view is that it will not take long. 
After some time, let us say 2-4 years, probably even less, as soon as companies 
bounce back, in the terms of the realization of this scenario, the government shall 
remember that it is, by definition, a bad manager and entrepreneur and begin a 
process of reprivatisation, with all possible concessions, tenders, speculation etc. (on 
the expense of tax payers), so it can relieve itself of the burden of commanding over 
the economy, and at the same time return to the old paths of the American dream.  
A circulus vitiosus follows, until the next slump, which is inevitable, because 
it lies in the very nature of capitalism, which had been historically proved a long time 
ago, at least in the diagnostic determination. We sincerely doubt in the reality of the 
first scenario, even if desire to be wrong, because life has no substitute, at least not 
an Earthly one, so permanent repetition of crisis periods would considerably discom-
fit the complacency of the original alternative – witnessing life on Earth.  109  Neoliberalism: Befall or Respite? 
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(II) Pessimistic/realistic scenario The foregoing scenario is far simpler, as 
from the aspect of current events, as well from the aspect of simulation, because it 
does not imply substantial changes of acting capitalism. A bit more compromises, 
truth, historical coverage, significant cosmetics in the field of regulation and estab-
lishing new rules, especially in the financial area and there’s the exit. Hence the con-
tent extensiveness, which had offered itself. 
We have named the second scenario using two terms because of our contem-
plation that the crisis is far more serious than discerned, thus the pessimism about the 
depth and the duration, and realism – the need for reviving, for facing and preparing 
for more serious consequences. At the same time, the pessimistic/realistic scenario 
starts from the presupposition that an evolutionary point in the capitalism develop-
ment has been reached, after which it is impossible to inertly continue, but funda-
mental and comprehensive changes are necessary in the system, as well as in the tis-
sue, or structure of capitalism. Therefore, the changes are of politically economic 
nature, which demand appropriate institutional and economic-political reforms. 
The first thing expected in this direction is the change of the dominant para-
digm, so not a short term waiving of core principles of neoliberal economy, but per-
manent abandoning of the given pattern with parallel construction of a new social 
context. Parallelism is necessary in order to avoid social vacuum, which would, in 
the very beginning, compromise the new pattern, and in time the reforms would be 
justified in all areas.  
The essential question that follows is the nature of the new paradigm. Can we, 
in fact,  speak about an absolutely new pattern, are there visions, concepts, theoreti-
cal-methodological and analytic support to the creation of a new form of organiza-
tion, or will, opportunistically, in the lack of ideas and courage, first of all because of 
the resisting of interests, the need to compromise, a new hermaphroditic system be 
improvised, by principle of a little bit of the new – a little bit of the old, so everyone 
is satisfied, but only in the given space of time, in terms of eyewitnesses. 
Suggested dilemmas about the possibility of creating a new social contract, 
new capitalist structure, with fundamental incorporation of corporative social respon-
sibility, rehabilitation of the welfare state in the direction of restoring dignity to the 
common man, reducing the degree of uncertainty and alienation amongst people, and 
with that sociopathology of everyday life, shall remain for some time.  
It is possible that the existing crisis will not result in serious systematic-
structural reform changes, at least while its course is not followed through. Particu-
larly, in accordance with previous positions about the duration of social projects, it is 
probably necessary that the existing, neoliberal concept rots to the end, examines all 
of its historical inability and unsustainability.  
In the conditions of such natural replacement of the ruling concept, a matter of 
a hereditary system is still open. In analogy to transferred courses from the nine-
teenth into the twentieth century (replacement of the liberal concept with the Keyne-
sian welfare state, then the reaffirmation of liberal in the form of neoliberal margina-
lization of government intervention and regulation), a phase of neo-wellfareism 
would follow, in which, although by crisis-interventionalism, we already are (Ob-
amanomics).  110  Kosta Josifidis, Alpar Lošonc and Novica Supić 
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The given reflections offer freedom of vision of systematic shifts in the twen-
ty-first century. Namely, after the future/soon reign of neo-wellfareism, a return to 
the liberal concept would follow, this time in the form of neoneo- or postneoliberal-
ism. And, till the end of the century, probably another rehabilitation of wellfareism, 
in the form of post-wellfareism. Obviously we presume a faster alternation of social 
concepts, so, not lasting for two generations, but shorter, because we are already 
faced with the fact of concentrated historical time, since no more than thirty years 
have passed from the time of Reaganomics until today. 
 Individualism, as a primary philosophical concept of the way of life, remains 
dominant, considering that there is no room for competition of a collectivistic nature 
in the philosophical structure of capital. Hence, as long as the neoliberal matrix is on 
the scene, based and supported precisely by homo oeconomicus, selfish and efficient, 
personal interests of the individual will not have a substitution. The question remains, 
of course, whether the replacement of individualism is at all possible in modernity 
(even with the disappearance of neo-liberalism), next, whether the replacement, if 
possible, is natural, evolutionary, imposed by the government or, again, imposed by 
force.  
In case that the replacement is forced by the government, which is the current 
situation, then the paradox is, accordingly, bigger, bearing that the government is 
nothing else but the representative team of the leading capitalist, braided in a demo-
cratic veil. But, the given paradox is explainable, and very easily too. The crisis, 
which was produced by that very capital, obviously cannot be overlooked other than 
by reaching for the assets of tax payers, which makes it logical for the government to 
impose its intervention ostensibly for the goal of rescuing from bigger collapses, 
mass unemployment, the living standard ultimately, when in fact the story is op-art 
coloured. Hence, the story goes back to the beginning, to individualism which opti-
cally, illusionary, in the understanding – seeing relation, collectivizes by need, inter-
nationalizes, democratizes in an Orwell manner, makes double standards, in essence 
personalizes. Interest, although an integral part of human conscience, has risen above 
the whole, man, and dominates man and his associative manifestation forms – gov-
ernment and society. 
Following the crucial segment of the eternal, ideal, finally discovered form of 
unifying human society, capitalism, the market mechanism, is not of questionable 
discourse, so, it is unquestionable, although probably chronically imperfect (even in 
the level of potential output, because the natural rate of unemployment is only a 
scientifically adopted convention, and nothing more, with significant additions of 
ideological, being that it is “natural “ that a certain percent of the population capable 
of working is unemployed). The weaknesses and advantages of the market-regulative 
instrumentality present themselves with periodical good/bad solutions of the prob-
lems of regulation vs. deregulation, ultimately unsolvable. They will interchange 
according to social cyclic or development stages, in the level of the government - 
(multi)national company - regional integration relationship. 
Since capitalism is not, as for now, in doubt as a form of human organizing, 
the market is not substitutable as well, which was experimentally proven in vivo in 
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of neoliberalism with a new social systematic order, regulation can gain more signi-
ficance, especially in the redistributable area, although the distribution itself has to be 
regulated more adequately, in order to avoid repeating neoliberal mistakes of immo-
derate money-grubbing and greed. Besides, neoliberalism did learn from liberalism 
that the reaction must be pumping in of money, as well as marginalization and ab-
straction of basic principles when the economy is in a serious crisis. 
In that sense, it is ungrateful for the future of the sustainable economy concept 
which is extremely complex and dispersed into many areas of social and economic 
life, to be determined more precise in abstracto, and especially in concreto in the 
conditions of an undefined duration of the current crisis and neoliberal philosophy. 
Sustainable economy implies reconciliation of different, mutually connected, but also 
ideologically contrasting segments of manifesting individuals vs. persons (it is not a 
mistake, we observe them separately: homo oeconomicus vs. homo comunalis), busi-
nesses/companies, government, society. The paradigm shift towards a holistic devel-
opment concept, instead of a reductionist orientation only on economic growth, 
would mean a genuine turning point, a (r)evolution. Realization and functioning of 
sustainable growth, of course, must be reclined on the market mechanism, which is 
by nature of things the most efficient actuator of investment activities and the area of 
managing limited resources. 
In the first scenario a more or less American story has been told. Also in the 
second, pessimistic/realistic scenario, it was impossible to avoid the American and 
the economy of the developed West. However, the world is in large in epochal tec-
tonic changes of geoeconomic and geopolitical nature.  
Chinese economy, for which a burden/test of drivers of world economy is ex-
pected, although it truly already is, determines its development path without rushing, 
a dual-track, a double system, since not even time is a scarce factor. In any case, the 
question remains who shall, in a few decades, be writing and exporting the rules of 
market or some other type of democracy, or mandarinocracy, in the secular meaning, 
and what those rules will be. The onset of other BRIC countries shall also mark the 
twenty first century to a great extent, especially its second half, with the need to build 
a new world architecture of political and economic power, which can already be seen 
from the fact that the G20, and not the G7/8, are conjointly attempting to find solu-
tions for exiting the current economic crisis, although the reality is that for the fol-
lowing decade or two the G2 will dominate, or in other words the chimerican capital-
ist/”Siamese” pregnant relationship. 
Does that mean that our observations of the interchangeable governing con-
cepts, liberal vs. interventionism, with all prefixes, become considerably more prob-
lematic? Most likely yes, but not necessarily, being that the predispositions of current 
and future systems/orders/regimes, remain unchanged – individualism, market, de-
mocracy, and finally let us mention competitiveness, not because we have not men-
tioned it so far, nor gave it  special notice, but in order not to keep it lexically ig-
nored.  
Namely, the mere fact that it is not possible to give up on the market, because 
it has no competition, that the nature of a human creature is egotized enough that 
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write it) sugar-coated lie, but smaller and more benign from other autocratic lies, in-
dicate that competitiveness remains the food, infallible prerequisite of further exis-
tence of human society, no matter how periodically it generates auto destruction. The 
question remains whether the dynamics, harshness and unscrupulousness of competi-
tiveness, have to be emphasized to the extent in which, in temporal sequences, they 
also generate social regress, not only progress. 
(iii) Promiscuous scenario Although the title itself reveals too much freedom 
on the side of the author, nevertheless, we cannot resist the impression that this sce-
nario too has significance precisely for the reason that it is partly confirmed in prac-
tice. The systematic ambivalence, mentioned before, with long term damage to the 
government, to a person, even capital, refer to the frivolousness and strategic insta-
bility in the functioning of capitalism. The frantic use of neoliberalism in years of 
prosperity, the unscrupulousness towards non-owners, undefined and poorly limited 
positions of owners and head managers, resulted in deep depression, followed by a 
crisis, only to find the salvation in the government. A respite, certainly limited in 
time, is under the function of capital, whose behaviour is therefore characterized as 
ideological and practical prostitution.  
Upon recuperation, the capital has no intent of making any changes in the neo-
liberal system, at least not any serious changes, and since it shall periodically again 
fall into crisis, it is evident that it has a backup variant which enables it to act arro-
gantly. The government is always there to lend a hand, to stop the collapse and ena-
ble the exit from the economic imbalance. The alternating exploitation of the advan-
tages of both regimes, the neoliberal and the government-interventionism one, shall 
only encourage the capital for future unjustified enrichment (in the very centre of the 
crisis certain companies still pay enormous bonuses to their managers and do that 
using the funds raised from tax payers – the top rated cynicism of capital). The gov-
ernment did not make a mistake by reacting, because the lack of reaction would have 
lead to the complete paralysis of the capitalist system (on which the capital was 
counting on), with possible unforeseeable events on the global level, but it demon-
strates that it is powerless to prevent profligacy, inappropriateness and hypocrisy of 
the capital. Or, the thesis of a personal-oligarchial nomenclatorial structure of the 
government is confirmed, with which its functions are finally stripped, and enable a 
never-ending vulgar curvy course of capitalism, regardless of the terminological sys-
tematic determination, and (con)temporality of double track alternation. 
(iv) Unconscious/confusing, wondering scenario – it is unknown what is going 
on; wondering in the dark, frightens the most. In the event of the existence of such a 
scenario too, and the fear is somewhat justified since there are no certain indications 
that the recession/crisis is nearing its end, at least not within a year or two, a logical 
question must follow, whether sufficient precautions have been taken to insure re-
covery, or confusion, wondering, searching, imitation, are after all present, the uncer-
tainty prolonged, the consequences incommensurable. This kind of speculation is 
possible, because it is simply incredible that in the conditions of such a level of engi-
neering sophistication and the development of the science of economy in which it de 
facto is (l’art pour l’art especially), the crisis could not have been anticipated and 
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from practice, which is a huge oversight and failure of the economic science. The 
pointed out imperialism of the economic science which is considered the only ge-
nuine science, the objectivity of this science as the paradigm for all possible sciences, 
experienced a difficult defeat. In alliance with the blossoming mathematical tech-
niques after the World War II it thought that it had viewed and mastered the regulari-
ty of quantity dynamics and with that acquired the right to direct the meaning of real-
ity. This crisis induces a self-understanding of the economic science, because its 
myopia, the forms of mathematical-deductive reasoning (Josifidis 2007; Victoria 
Chick 2008; Tony Lawson 2009; Sheila Dow 2008, p. 27) which dominated its think-
ing, requires serious cogitation of its status and range. We should, therefore, consider 
the fact that in the context of this crisis the capacities of interpreting the economic 
reflection have been brought into question (David Colander et al. 2008; Daron 
Acemoglu  2009). Insecurity is formed, in terms of the capacity of the economic 
science, to include in its highly formalized models the modalities of economic dy-
namics which is, and it should be always pointed out, socially mediated. Because the 
structuring of reality based on the comprehension of economic subjects as isolated 
atoms that are strictly determined by certain samples, does not contribute to the un-
derstanding of practicing economy as an open practice. We must not forget Keynes’ 
indication: “Unlike their typical natural science, the material to which it is applied is, 
in too many respects, not homogeneous through time... In chemistry and physics and 
other natural sciences the object of experiment is to fill the actual values of the vari-
ous quantities and factors appearing in an equation or a formula; and the work when 
done is once and for all. In economics that is not the case, and to convert a model 
into a quantitative formula is to destroy its usefulness as an instrument of thought... 
The pseudo-analogy with the physical sciences lead directly counter to the habit of 
mind which it is most important for an economist to acquire... One has to be con-
stantly on guard against treating the material as constant and homogeneous.“ (John 
Maynard Keynes 1973, pp. 296-300; Terence W. Hutchison 1981, p. 278; Geoffrey 
M. Hodgson 2009; Axel Leijonhufvud 2009). The performance of economic science 
treated inrecent time (Michael Callon 2007) implies that it has contributed to a great 
extent to the neoliberal self-understanding of the epoch. There is a peril that some 
time ago John Hicks stated: “There is much of economic theory which is pursued for 
no better reason than its intellectual attraction; it is a good game“ (John Hicks 1981, 
p. VIII). Accordingly, the wager of this crisis is also the transformation of self-
understanding economic reflection, its understanding of causality in economic prac-
tice. The confusion in practice, the confusion in economic science, or vice versa, 
normally results in crisis situations. But, it is even more frightening that exiting the 
crisis is predominantly encouraged based on minute positive signals, and not on the 
basis of authentic evidence of adequacy of the taken measures and complete strategy 
on the (inter)national plain. In the long term context, hope remains that the uncons-
cious scenario will be minimized, that the confusion will be overlooked with a timely 
reaction in the sense of eliminating the possibilities of the outbreaks of the depres-
sion plague. Economic science must also assume such a burden for the future, at least 
from the point of forecasting and timely warning, and it is upon the administration to 
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the way of life, whatever it looks like and is called, is inseparable from unconscious, 
accidental, periodically eruptive events, and we are unsure that they can always be 
forecasted with precision, and with that, be eliminated. 
(v) Conscious, uncertain scenario – the nature of the crisis is being manipu-
lated and concealed, shares a common characteristic with the previous scenario in 
uncertainty, but with the distinction that it is a product of a conscious activity with 
the goal of, not only achieving enormous income by the privileged layer, but also for 
creating a particular atmosphere in society, in order to mobilize it in a different direc-
tion compared to the natural social directions. Also highlighted in this context is the 
dilemma whether significant historical changes can be linked to a random appearance 
of new, charismatic leaders, or it is a product of conscious action by the certain social 
elite, which manipulatively controls events, as well as national and global history. 
We do not engage in further thought deduction, because they exceed the frame not 
only of exploratory, but also essay approach, but it is sensible to indicate that the 
XXI century will not be immune to such fantastic ventures. 
(vi) Military, (un)certain scenario – it is clear what it is about, and with what 
means, is a multiple century continuity of countries and epochs. The only question is 
whether it abides the boundaries of the usual - (extra)profits in the military industry – 
or escalates into the production of regional or wider scale wars. It is constantly in the 
function of nourishing aggregate demand by the fiscus, by which it contributes to the 
economic growth rates and employment. Again, we point to a specific paradox. 
Namely, military Keynesianism (Sonmez H. Atesoglu 2002, 2004) has been present 
in continuity from the very creation, regardless of the neoliberal period, because none 
of the significant superpowers/countries, in conjunction with multinational corpora-
tions, shall waive its position. On the other hand, the military sector is an excellent 
absorber of economic disturbances in recessional condition and a generator of tech-
nology booms, being that the government is the biggest client.  
We presume that the current crisis will not be resolved with a more serious 
manufacturing of wars as well, or that the exit lies in the peaceful sphere. Such is the 
projection for the entire century – the struggle for the advantages and profits on the 
external, and economic growth and profits, of course, on the national plain. The other 
subscenario in within this scenario points to a civilization collapse, although the pos-
sibility of regional nuclear wars is still in play. If such an alternative to a universal 
nuclear war is also done, the world will periodically be facing that sort of technologi-
cal games. The NATO bombing of Yugoslavia was also a precedent, therefore it is 
not ruled out that regional nuclear wars will be led, if global terrorism ignites to such 
scales that it cannot be restrained differently. Or, which has been empirically proved, 
if and when geopolitical and geoeconomic interests of leading forces do not match 
with the existence of smaller countries which do not comply to be in a satellite posi-
tion.  But, an alibi for starting new military actions shall always be found. The ques-
tion is whether it will be resolved with aggression, or painstaking negotiation. As an 
exit for acute economic problems, the military scenario always remains at the dispos-
al of administrations. 
 115  Neoliberalism: Befall or Respite? 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2010, 1, pp. 101-117
Epilogue: It is unnecessary to note that the key teeter is on the relation of the 
first two scenarios, that the supporting scenarios are by all means, more or less, 
present precisely in both main ones. The effective world, primarily the developed 
one, will have a little more time to be inert, to repeat itself on a higher or lower quan-
titative or qualitative level. The time of substantial changes is definitely coming pre-
cisely in the sense of open dilemmas on a national and supranational scale. 
Thereby we have ended our attempt to examine the existing situation on a 
general systematic plain and the simulation of possible scenarios of future global 
functioning. It is evident, as it were expected, that many questions and dilemmas re-
main open, considering that the mediation of analytic-synthetic reflections of the ex-
istence of current and future life was only possible from an (un)comfortable com-
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